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Abstract 
In this paper 1 shail be concerned with a set of issues which will allow me to approach the 
interface between linguistics, conceived as a theory of linguistic knowledge (Chomsky 
1992, 1995), and pragmatics, conceived as a theory of utterance interpretation (Sperber 
- Wilson 1986), and in particular to examine the contribution of linguistic meaning to 
utterance interpretation. The analysis 1 propose involving the content of some lexical items 
will allow me to put forward the hypothesis that any specification for meaning represen- 
tation which is contained within a lexical entry must be understood as a type of constraint 
or instruction on the process of building up the logical structure or propositional form 
corresponding to a given utterance (Kempson 1992). 
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1. The lexicon within a theory of language 
According to the generative approach to the study of language, such as the 
one develo~ed by Chomsky (1992, 1995), a language L is an instantiation of 
the language faculty, and an internalized language is a generative procedure 
that generates structural descriptions. 
A language consists of two components: a lexicon and a computational 
system. The lexicon specifies the minimal lexical units that are incorporated 
into the computational system, together with their idiosyncratic properties 
(i.e., ph~nolo~ical, morphological, syntactic, and semantic features). The com- 
putational system uses these lexical items to generate derivations and struc- 
tural descriptions. Each structural description constitutes a complex of semantic, 
phonetic, and syntactic properties, which are the expressions of a language. 
This means that the derivation of a particular linguistic expression involves 
a choice of items from the lexicon and a computation that generates the 
pair of interface representations: the Phonetic Form and the Logical Form 
(which in generative grammar are referred to by means of the terms PF and 
LF). A language L must provide instructions to be interpreted at these two 
interface levels, in the sense that each structural description contains a set of 
instructions for each of the performance systems in which language is embed- 
ded (mainly the Articulatory-Perce~tual and the Conceptual-Intentional). 
Accordingly, it is assumed that the only levels of linguistic representation are 
the interface levels, and al1 conditions to be specified in a theory of language 
express properties of these levels, properties related to requirements of the 
interface. 
It should also be noted that according to this design, the lexicon must spec- 
i+ the properties of minimal lexical items that enter into the computational 
system. If a structural description is a set of instructions for articulating, inter- 
preting, referring, and so on in an appropriate way, then it must also be the 
case that the components of these structural descriptions introduce a set of 
instructions for building an appropriate articulation, interpretation, and refer- 
ente assignment for a linguistic expression; that is, they are the building blocks 
of a leve1 of representation which interfaces with the Conceptual-Intentional 
system. An item in the lexicon is nothing other than a set of lexical features, a 
set of instructions to be interpreted at the above mentioned interface 1evels.l 
From a different theoretical approach, known as the Labelled Deductive 
System (LDS) perspective (see Kempson 1992, in press; Gabbay 1992; Gabbay 
1. Also central to this view is the assumption that universal grammar is concerned with the 
invariant principies that characterize the initial state of knowledge of language and the 
range of permissible variation. It is assumed that beyond variation in PF options and lexi- 
cal arbitrariness, variation is limited to nonsubstantive parts of the lexicon (sudi as properties 
of grammatical formatives: inflection) and general properties of lexical irems (e.g., the head 
parameter). Accordingly, following a minimalist program for linguistic theory (see Chomsky 
1992), there is only one computational system and one lexicon, apart from this limited 
kind of variety. 
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- Kempson 1992a, 1992b), it is assumed that both a lexicon and a compu- 
tational procedure are crucial for building logical structures in natural deduc- 
tion systems. Utterance interpretation -according to Kempson (in press: 10)- 
can be defined «as a process of natural deduction from some initiating set of 
premises to some conclusion a:t, a being the proposition expressed, with 
some of the words presented as premises to that conclusion, others determin- 
ing how the conclusion is reached)). It is important to bear in mind that 
Gabbay and Kempson postulate one single computational system (or parsing 
procedure) which corresponds to the general reasoning system; the building 
of logical structures is not characterized as a grammar-interna1 process but as 
a process of central cognitive reasoning, for they abandon the concept of the 
language faculty as a body of knowledge independent of the faculty of rea- 
~ o n i n ~ . ~  
Following a LDS approach it is assumed that the way in which our lan- 
guages are structured directly reflects the way we reason and, therefore, that 
universal grammar, as a separate encapsulated language faculty, is replaced by 
a rich syntactic theory of mind. The encapsulation of the language faculty, as 
an independent input to processes of general reasoning, is reduced to a body 
of information encoded in the lexicon, information which drives the inferen- 
tia1 task of building the required structured databases. 
Stored in the lexicon for each lexical item is a specification of its contri- 
bution to utterance interpretation. These specifications encode restrictions 
whereby inference structures are not merely deduced, but progressively built. 
These specifications, therefore, lie at the heart of the procedural perspective 
to natural language interpretation. 
In a LDS approach, language is conceived as a goal-directed inference sys- 
tem. Therefore, linguistic constructions and lexical units must be thought of 
as instructions for this inferential process. Following a natural deduction sys- 
tem, utterance interpretation is characterized as an inferential process of syn- 
tactically building a proof structure, and the result is a model of natural language 
in which a single concept of structure emer es: thai of database construction, 
on which inference is dynamically defined. B 
2. The model of reasoning developed by Gabbay (1990), and assumed in later work in colla- 
boration with R. Kempson (Gabbay - Kempson 1992a), has the following properties: 
(i) It defines processes of deduction. It involves rules and additional choices to be made 
during the course of the proof. 
(ii) It is procedural, reflecting the way information unfolds through a reasoning task. 
(iii) It licenses the injection of extra choices to be made on-line. It embeds representations 
of premises (formulae) and representations of additional control features as constraints 
on the proof process (through the labels). 
(iv) It permits the articulation of additional constraints over and above the steps of deduc- 
tion themselves. 
3. Notice that a shift is proposed from analysing natural-language structure statically (Le., a con- 
tent describable in terms of some suitable logic for which familiar concepts of inference 
ate available) to approaching natural-language interpretation dynamically (i.e., from a pro- 
cedural perspective). 
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Following this perspective, the meaning of a linguistic expression is 
defined in terms of the procedures required to build an inference structure; 
that is, it is defined in terms of the contribution to the dynamics of how the 
information flow is built up. 
In summary, according to a proof-theoretic perspective, lexical items contain 
specifications which constrain the building of a proof-structure from which the 
more orthodox concept of truth-content may be derived. The input informa- 
tion, characterized as the lexicon, is necessary for the deduction process: mean- 
ings assigned to minimal lexical items induce the building of discrete structures. 
Between these two different approaches (the minimalist program and LDS) 
there are still some basic assumptions in common. 
1. Natural language provides a set of procedures and principles for sentence 
construction. A language is a set of procedures encoded in a lexicon. The 
lexicon no longer stipulates interpretations for lexical items, rather it 
stipulates instructions for sentence meaning and utterance interpretation. 
Syntax is a computational system; it is the set of principles which charac- 
terizes the structural properties of linguistic expressions and dictates struc- 
tural constraints on asignable interpretations. 
2. Pragmatics provides an explanation of how a hearer takes a given sequence 
of words as input and uses it to recover further information about what is said 
and what is communicated. It provides a map of linguistic objects (i.e., syn- 
tactic structures) and non-linguistic entities (i.e., conceptual structures or 
propositional forms), and a relation between conceptual structures mani- 
fested within the central cognitive system. Utterance interpretation should 
be defined as a process of natural deduction from some initiating set of 
premises to some conclusion. It relies on general reasoning principles which 
manipulate the incoming linguistic information in the reasoning task of 
establishing a structured representation as the interpretation of a given string. 
2. The content of lexical items 
Having addressed the basic assumptions of some leading approaches to the 
study of language, 1 shall now consider the linguistic meaning of lexical items 
and the type of lexical items that may be assigned to different types of infor- 
mation, decoded and inferred, that an utterance can convey (Wilson - Sperber 
1993). 
A. Lexical items whose logical content contributes to the proposition expres- 
sed by an utterance. Most lexical items (including nouns, verbs, adjec- 
tives, adverbials, and prepositions) of natural languages encode conceptual 
information which contributes explicitly to the proposition communicated 
by an utterance (i.e., its truth-conditional content, what is said), techni- 
cally referred to as the explicature of the utterance (Sperber - Wilson 1986, 
Carston 1988). 
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(1) Iceland has a wonderful countryside 
In (1) only the lexical meanings of has, wonderfiland countryside con- 
tribute conceptually to the proposition expressed by this utterance. The 
proper noun does not have any logical content, and the indefinite does not 
introduce conceptual information. 
B. Lexical items whose logical content should be defined in terms of con- 
ceptual representations which do not contribute to the truth-conditions 
of the utterances in which they occur, but which contribute to higher-leve1 
descriptions (e.g., a speech-act description, a propositional attitude des- 
cription, etc.). This class of lexical items seems to include sentence adverb- 
ials pragmatically oriented towards the speakerlhearer, since these 
illocutionary adverbials are said to encode concepts which are constituents 
not of the proposition expressed but of higher-leve1 explicatures. 
(2) C~nfidentiall~, Mary is unhappy with John 
Notice that in (2) the adverbial conjdentially does not provide a con- 
ceptual description that modifies any constituent of the structural des- 
cription it precedes, neither does it express an attitude of Mary or John; 
rather, the logical content of this adverbial expresses the attitude of the 
speaker when (S) he communicates a specific proposition to the hearer. 
C. Lexical items which contribute to implicatures.* According to Grice (1975, 
1989), discourse connectives words, which are treated as carrying conven- 
tional implicatures, fall into this class. 
(3) There is no light. But John is still in his off~ce 
The exarnple in (3) illustrates the fact that certain lexical items, such 
as but, do not contribute to the meaning of any of the two propositions 
expressed by the corresponding utterance. However, the utterance in (3) 
expresses an information of contrast, which is not truth-conditional, but 
which is inferable from the meaning of but. 
D. Lexical items which constrain the proposition expressed. This category 
includes those items which presumably encode (non-conceptual) procedural 
information, and so restrict the truth-conditional content of the prop- 
4. Grice (1975)   os tul ates that, in the event of an apparent violation of the co-operative 
~ r i n c i ~ l e  and the maxirns of conversation, hearers are ex~ected to make additional assump- 
tions and conclusions, needed in order to dispose of the violation. These implicated premises 
and conclusions are called implicatures. 
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osition conveyed. The analysis of pronouns provide good evidence for the 
existence of constraints on explicatures (Kempson 1987, 1990, 1992). 
(4) a. L'odia 
CL hates 
'(S)he hates himlher' 
b. La Maria no saluda en Joan. De fet, l'odia 
Maria not greets Joan. In fact CL hates 
'Maria doesn't greet John. In fact, she hates him' 
c. Cadascun dels ajudants creu que un becari l'odia 
each one of the assistants thinks that a scholarship student him hates 
'Each one of the assistants thinks that a scholarship student hates hirn' 
Notice that in (4a) the Catalan clitic pronouns el/h refer to some entity 
which is made explicit neither within the linguistic expression, nor in the 
linguistic discourse; their reference will be assigned by means of an access 
to contextual information. In (4b) the clitic refers to Joan in virtue of co- 
reference with the linguistic expression en Joan which appears in the dis- 
course. In (4c) the clitic does not refer to a fixed non-linguistic entity: a 
particular assistant, but to any assistant that might be considered in the 
discourse. This is because in (4c) el is bound to a quantifier antecedent 
which appears as subject of the main clause. 
As argued by Kempson (1987) with regard to English data, the various 
readings ella may have (among others, the referential, the coreferential, 
and the bound-variable reading, illustrated in (4)) should not be attributed 
to an across-the-board phenomenon of ambiguity, but to the sort of under- 
specified linguistic information these lexical items have, which constrains 
the proposition expressed. 
E. Lexical items which constrain the higher-leve1 explicatures of an utterance, 
that is, which restrict the illocutionary force and propositional attitude 
that should be inferred from a particular utterance. This class is intended 
to include lexical items such as discourse particles, which are assumed to 
convey illocutionary and attitudinal functions (e.g., French ti, Sissala re, 
English eh, Catalan 02).  The argument for postulating this category pro- 
ceeds as follows: illocutionary particles do not encode any concept, rather 
they constrain the sort of propositional attitude of either the speaker or 
the hearer towards the proposition expressed. 
(5) Oi que vindras? 
PART that come 
'You are going to come, aren't you?' 
This example can illustrate the fact that a lexical item such as oi in 
Catalan conveys information which is intended to restrict nothing other 
than the assent of the hearer on the speaker's intended proposition. 
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F. Lexical items which constrain the implicatures inferred from an utterance. 
They are believed to be a set of lexical items which neither constrain the 
expIicit content, nor the truth-conditions of the proposition uttered, nor 
the attitude of the speakerlhearer towards what is being saidlrequested in 
the utterance. Following Blakemore (1987), connective words in discourse 
have been claimed to introduce semantic constraints on relevance, which 
means that they are said to introduce different sorts of restrictions on the 
logical relationship that must take place between the utterance contain- 
ing the connective word and some specific -to be chosen- contextual 
environment. 
Whereas for Grice (see point C above), the conventional implicatures 
of an utterance are arbitrarily stipulated and encode some conceptual infor- 
mation, for Blakemore connective words encode some procedural infor- 
mation. 
So far, we have considered the major types of lexical items that may be 
found in a natural language, with regard to the different types of infor- 
mation conveyed by an utterance (as postulated by Wilson - Sperber 1993). 
The next issue 1 shall deal with will be to show that conceptual specifica- 
tions of lexical items are a subset of the semantic instructions that might im- 
pose either at the level of representation which is supposed to be the interface 
between language and the Conceptual-Intentional system (in the minimalist pro- 
gram), or at the level of logical structure (in LDS). 
3. Linguistic instructions 
The claim just made is based on the assumption that lexical items are to be 
conceived as sets of instructions. Among the set of constraints on LF or data- 
base building formation (see section l), various types of specifications should 
be di~tin~uished: some of them may provide conceptual information, others pro- 
vide logical information (e.g., logical type category, that is, LF-selection spe- 
cifications, and logical constraints on the connection of premises, illustrated 
below), and still others provide syntactic information (e.g., restrictions on the 
scope effects that certain adjuncts always have over other adjuncts; for exam- 
ple, modal adverbs and certain temporal adverbs and temporal quantifiers with 
regard to the negative operator). Let us illustrate this claim. 
Any lexical item of class A in section 2 has a basic semantic contribution to 
utterance interpretation which corresponds to one or several concepts, and 
this conceptual expression is a set of attributes predicated of some individual(s). 
In addition to a conceptual expression, the semantic contribution of lexical 
items such as have, wonderfil, and countyside should specify its logical type. 
The logical type is due to speci+ the semantic category corresponding to 
any specific syntactic category: an individual denoting expression e, a truth 
bearing expression t, or any combinatorial function on these. The logical type 
category is equivalent to its LF-selection, because it refers to a specification of 
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the argument structure that lexical items such as verbs, adjectives and nouns may 
induce. 
Thus, for example, a noun such as countryside should be conceived as a 
lexical item which involves a specific conceptual description (the predicate 
countyside) plus the logical instructions e->t, which means that the contri- 
bution of the concept countyside to the process of interpretation is a one place 
predicate, which means that it is function from individuals (e.g., Iceland) to 
truth-values (e.g., countryside (Icehnd)). 
The logical constraints on the connection of premises refer to the logical 
information that lexical items such as relative markers encode, since they pro- 
vide a means of constructing linked pieces of information. 
(6) They will travel from Akureyri to Reykjavík, where they will take the 
plane 
In (6) an important component of the lexical meaning corresponding to 
the relative word where is a specification of the logical device according 
to which the hearer must understand that the antecedent of the pronoun is the 
town denoted by Reykjavik, not the one denoted by Akureyri. Thus, the con- 
tribution of the relative pronoun to utterance interpretation consists in spec- 
iQing the connection that holds between the two propositions being linked, 
taken as premises. 
Finally, in order to illustrate the claim that among the set of constraints 
on LF or database building formation sometimes some syntactic specifications 
should also be s~ecified, let us consider the following examples. 
(7) a. Naturalment, no farem tard 
naturally, not make -1ppl late 
'Naturally, we'll not be late' 
b. Ja no farem tard 
any more not make -1ppl late 
'We'll not be late any more' 
Modal adverbs (i.e., naturalment), as well as certain temporal adverbs (e.g., 
ja 'already, not any more'), always have wide scope over other operators and 
quantifiers appearing in the syntactic structure (e.g., the negative operator). 
Therefore, the building of the meaning configurations corresponding to these 
sentences are actually determined by the syntactic specifications stipulated in 
the lexical entries corresponding to the adverbs. 
Thus, it is neither the case that the semantic analysis of certain lexical 
entries is exhausted by its associated conceptual description, nor that al1 
lexical entries contain conceptual information. Conceptual encoding is pos- 
sible, but it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient semantic characterization of 
lexical items. 
In the following section 1 would like to point out one further issue on the 
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contribution of lexical meaning to utterance interpretation, on the assump- 
tion that al1 lexical items somehow underdetermine the logical structure which 
corresponds to the linguistic expression in which they occur. The goal of this dis- 
cussion is to make explicit that the different types of instructions (conceptual, 
logical and syntactic) encoded by lexical items, which must be implemented 
following some general reasoning task, are not mutually exclusive, in the sense 
that one single lexical item can encode both conceptual contributions to the pro- 
position expressed and logical constraints on the proposition expressed. 
4. Catalan no.. . pas 
A good example which can be considered in order to illustrate the claim just 
made is provided by Catalan negation. 
Let us compare the following examples. 
(8) a. La Maria no vindri 
Maria not come 
'Maria is not going to come' 
b. La Maria no vindri pas 
Maria not come not 
'Maria is actually not going to come'5 
Like no, no-pas is an adjunct constituent which is involved in a syntactic 
relation of modification within the syntactic structure in which it occurs. In 
accordance with this grarnmatical contribution, the negative markers -being 
adjunct adverbials- are generated somewhere within the sentential domain, 
and it is precisely the structural positions these adverbs occupy at LF that deter- 
mine their logical role as propositional modifiers -that is, as propositional 
scope operators. 
Furthermore, no.. . pas (Espinal 1993) can be said to constrain the com- 
prehension process by instructing the hearer that (s)he has to take the proposition 
in which no... pas appears as a premise, and enrich this proposition in such a 
way that some cognitive effects may be obtained. These may be either the re- 
inforcement or cancellation of the proposition; certain inferences derived from 
what the speakerlhearer considers to be a desirable thought (in interrogative 
contexts); or a prohibition reinforcement or threat (in imperative contexts). 
Since (8b) is a declarative sentence, its interpretation corresponds to either 
a cancellation or a reinforcement of a contextually specified proposition. What 
is interesting is that no... pas is a lexical item whose logical instructions may 
be said to encode a constraint on implicatures, but whose logical content (i.e., 
the negative logical operator) contributes simultaneously to the proposition 
expressed. 
5. «Not» against what you appear to think, «not» against what somebod~ might suppose, 
«not» confirrning what sorneone might believe. 
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5. Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper I began with some of the basic questions within a theory of lan- 
guage: what is the lexicon, and what is a lexical item. In section 2,1 presented 
an overview of the various types of lexical items that may be assigned to different 
types of information, decoded and inferred, conveyed by an utterance. Sections 
3 and 4 are devoted to the notion of linguistic instructions, and to illustrate 
the claim that one single lexical item can encode different types of semantic 
information. 
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